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H.R. 4624: THE PITFALLS OF A  
SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION  
FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND WHY 
USER FEES WOULD BETTER ACCOMPLISH 
THE GOAL OF INVESTMENT ADVISER 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
DAVID G. TITTSWORTH† 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 25, 2012, Representative Spencer Bachus III (R-Al.) 
introduced House Bill 4624, the Investment Adviser Oversight 
Act of 2012 (“H.R. 4624”), which mandated membership in a self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”) for many Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and state-registered investment 
advisers.  The bill, while ultimately not enacted, would have 
subjected thousands of advisory firms to an additional layer of 
regulation by a private regulator with broad rulemaking, 
inspection, and enforcement authority—and, in all likelihood, 
that private regulator would have been the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 
The Investment Adviser Association (“IAA”) strongly opposed 
H.R. 4624.  The substantial drawbacks to an SRO significantly 
outweigh any potential benefits.  These drawbacks include 
minimal transparency and accountability, insufficient oversight 
by the SEC and Congress, conflicts of interest, excessive costs, 
and the lack of meaningful due process protections and cost-
benefit analysis restraints. 
H.R. 4624 unfairly targeted small businesses.  Because of 
exemptions in the bill, smaller advisers were singled out for 
additional regulation and costs.  The substantial costs and 
 
† Executive Director and Executive Vice President, Investment Adviser 
Association. This Article is adapted from the author’s statement from The 
Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4624 Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2012). 
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bureaucracy of an additional, unnecessary layer of SRO 
regulation and oversight of advisory firms would have had a 
significant adverse impact on small businesses and job creation.  
Further, the bill would have resulted in inconsistent regulation 
and regulatory arbitrage. 
Supporters indicated that the bill responded to an SEC 
report mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) studying various 
options to enhance SEC examinations of investment advisers.  If 
enhancing investment adviser examinations was the objective, 
however, H.R. 4624 represented both the least effective and the 
most costly option.  H.R. 4624 ventured far beyond the focus on 
investment adviser examinations to extend an additional layer of 
unnecessary regulation on advisers.  Supporters also claimed 
that the bill would have “level[ed] [the] playing field” for brokers 
and advisers.1  They did not, however, commend the benefits of 
FINRA regulation.  Rather, this was an attempt to impose on 
investment advisers the same regulatory framework that 
currently exists for brokers.  Far from leveling the playing field, 
this bill would have created a dramatically tilted playing field by 
burdening those investment advisers captured by this bill with 
additional, unnecessary regulation. 
The IAA particularly opposed, and still opposes, extending 
FINRA’s jurisdiction to investment advisers due to its lack of 
transparency and accountability, questionable track record, 
experience and bias favoring the broker-dealer regulatory model, 
and the costs involved.  Alternatively, the IAA has expressed 
support for appropriate measures to enhance the SEC’s 
examination program for investment advisers.  The SEC, a 
governmental regulator that is accountable to Congress and the 
public, has more than seven decades of experience and expertise 
regulating and inspecting investment advisers.  The SEC is best 
positioned to provide effective oversight for all SEC-registered 
investment advisers, irrespective of asset size and type of clients 
served.  To ensure that the SEC has sufficient resources for 
adviser oversight, and as an alternative to an SRO, the IAA 
supports the assessment of an appropriate “user fee” on SEC-
 
1 The Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4624 Before the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 42 (2012) (statement of Chet Helck, Chief 
Executive Officer, Global Private Client Group, Raymond James Financial Inc. and 
Chairman-Elect, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association). 
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registered investment advisers to be used solely to fund 
additional examinations by the SEC.  Legislation to authorize 
user fees should include provisions that: (1) specifically preclude 
any investment adviser SRO if such fees are imposed; (2) clarify 
that such user fees will be dedicated to an increased level of 
investment adviser examinations—instead of simply being used 
as substitute funding for the existing level of examinations; and 
(3) set forth specific SEC reporting requirements and review of 
any such user fees by Congress and the public. 
The user fee approach provides many benefits.  User fees 
would provide stable yet scalable resources to support and 
strengthen the SEC’s examination of investment advisers.  The 
fees collected would be used solely to fund enhancements to the 
investment adviser examination program and increase the 
frequency of adviser examinations.  Importantly, the reporting 
and accountability embedded in the user fee approach would 
provide substantial transparency and opportunity for 
congressional oversight and public input. 
As demonstrated by a Boston Consulting Group (“BCG”) 
report, the costs of user fees would be significantly less than the 
costs of SRO oversight.2  Further, if an investment adviser SRO 
were mandated, the resulting new oversight responsibilities 
would require the SEC to expend significant additional 
resources.  In summary, the IAA strongly believes that there are 
better answers than the option presented by H.R. 4624.  Now 
that the bill has been defeated, the IAA strongly urges Congress 
to consider other—and better—options. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Investment advisers manage assets for a wide array of 
individual and institutional investors.  As of April 2013, 
approximately 10,500 investment advisers were registered with 
the SEC, collectively managing assets totaling about $54.8 
trillion for millions of individual and institutional clients.3  
 
2 BOS. CONSULTING GRP., INVESTMENT ADVISOR OVERSIGHT: ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS (2011), available at http://advisors4advisors.com/files/BCG_ 
IAOversightStudy.pdf. 
3 See INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., 2012 EVOLUTION 
REVOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER PROFESSION 2 (2013), 
available at https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/Rep 
orts_and_Brochures/IAA-NRS_Evolution_Revolution_Reports/evolution_revolution_ 
2013.pdf. 
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Investment advisers engage in a wide range of advisory activities 
and implement investment strategies on behalf of their clients, 
including constructing securities portfolios pursuant to client 
directives, recommending asset allocation, providing portfolio 
analysis and evaluation, assisting in selecting and monitoring 
other advisers, and providing wealth management and financial 
planning services.  In addition, investment advisers manage 
assets for individuals, families, trusts, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, private equity funds, pension plans, state and municipal 
entities, banks, insurance companies, charitable endowments, 
foundations, and corporations, and serve as sub-advisers to funds 
or accounts managed by other advisers.  These activities play a 
critical role in helping investors, both individually and through 
pooled investment vehicles, achieve their financial goals. 
While investment advisory firms range from small, local or 
regional firms to large global financial institutions with varying 
business models, the overwhelming majority of investment 
advisory firms are small businesses.  Indeed, more than half of 
all federally-registered advisers employ fewer than ten 
employees and more than eighty-five percent employ fewer than 
fifty non-clerical employees.4  In addition, most of the 17,300 
state-registered investment advisers are small businesses.5  A 
self-regulatory organization, such as that mandated by H.R. 
4624, would have disproportionately affected these small 
businesses, subjecting them to expansive rulemaking, inspection, 
and enforcement authority by a private regulator. 
H.R. 4624 would have mandated SRO membership for SEC-
registered and state-registered investment advisers, subject to 
broad exemptions.6  Specifically, the legislation would have 
exempted an advisory firm if it had a single mutual fund as a 
client—no matter the fund’s size and regardless of other firm 
characteristics.7  The legislation would have also exempted an 
advisory firm if ninety percent or more of the firm’s assets under 
management (“AUM”) were attributable to “qualified 
purchasers”—that is, individuals with $5 million in investments 
 
4 Id. 
5 See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, THE IA SWITCH: A SUCCESSFUL 
COLLABORATION TO ENHANCE INVESTOR PROTECTION 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/IA-Switch-Report.pdf. 
6 H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012). 
7 Id. 
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or institutions with $25 million in investments—hedge funds, 
private equity funds, venture capital funds, non-U.S. clients, 
other investment advisers and broker-dealers, and other entities, 
including certain non-profit clients, real estate funds, issuers of 
asset-backed securities, and tax-qualified retirement funds.8  In 
addition, investment advisers that were affiliated with these 
exempt advisory firms would have been largely excluded from the 
SRO membership requirement.9  The SEC, however, would have 
been tasked with determining on a case-by-case basis whether an 
affiliate is sufficiently independent from the exempt adviser such 
that SRO membership should be required.10 
The bill would have required that SRO rules be designed to 
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts, to promote “business 
conduct standards” for its members consistent with advisers’ 
obligations to investors, to be consistent with the fiduciary 
standards applicable to advisers under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) or state law, and to not unnecessarily 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with such laws.11  The SRO would 
have had authority to enforce the Advisers Act and any SRO 
rules and to establish disciplinary procedures to do so.12  The bill 
would have required SRO rules to establish appropriate 
procedures to “register persons associated with members” and to 
require “supervisory systems” for members and their associated 
persons.13 
Under the bill, the SRO would have been required to provide 
for “periodic” examinations of its members and their associated 
persons to determine compliance with the Advisers Act and SRO 
rules.14  However, the SRO would not have conducted periodic 
exams of a state-regulated adviser in a state that had adopted a 
plan to conduct an on-site examination of all state-regulated 
advisers, on average, once every four years.15  In addition, the 
SRO would have been permitted to conduct “for cause” exams of 
all members of the SRO, including state-registered advisers.16 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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The bill would have required the SEC to conduct annual 
inspections of the SRO to ensure it complied with the Advisers 
Act and its rules and regulations.17  Further, the bill would have 
required the SRO to issue a publicly available annual report to 
the SEC on its operations, performance, and financial condition.18  
Although the legislation would have allowed for more than one 
“national investment adviser association” to apply to become an 
adviser SRO, the bill was structured to most readily enable 
FINRA to act in that capacity.19 
II. WHY THE IAA STRONGLY OPPOSED H.R. 4624 AND AN SRO 
FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS GENERALLY 
The IAA strongly opposes mandating an SRO for investment 
advisers.  The SEC’s regulation and oversight of investment 
advisers should not be outsourced to a private regulator 
unaccountable to Congress or the public.  The IAA believes that 
the SEC is the most efficient and effective regulator of SEC-
registered investment advisers.  There is simply no compelling 
reason to outsource oversight of investment advisers to either a 
new SRO or any existing entity that has no expertise with the 
investment adviser industry or its regulatory framework. 
The SRO regime that would have been established by H.R. 
4624 is flawed.  It would have resulted in inconsistent regulation 
of the same or similar activities and encouraged regulatory 
arbitrage.  In addition, the SRO model set forth in H.R. 4624 was 
not cost effective.  It would have specifically targeted small 
businesses for unnecessary costs and burdens, exacerbated the 
SEC’s challenges in allocating its resources, and resulted in 
unnecessary expansion of burdensome regulations and 
bureaucracy.  The legislation was clearly designed to favor 
FINRA’s organizational model.  We particularly oppose extending 
FINRA’s jurisdiction to investment advisers, due to FINRA’s lack 
of investment adviser expertise, lack of accountability, lack of 
transparency, excessive costs, and questionable track record. 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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A. The SRO Model Is Flawed. 
The SRO model of regulation suffers from significant flaws.  
SROs are not accountable to Congress or the public and are not 
subject to requirements related to the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”), the public records laws, due process, the Freedom of 
Information Act, cost-benefit analysis, and other critical 
protections.  Moreover, the effectiveness of SROs has not been 
demonstrated.  These deficiencies in the SRO model have been 
identified in meaningful reports and studies, including those 
from the SEC staff, the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Boston 
Consulting Group. 
Congress, in Dodd-Frank Act section 914, directed the SEC 
to conduct a study to review and analyze the need for enhanced 
examination and enforcement resources of investment advisers.  
The SEC issued a staff report (“Section 914 Report”) expressing 
concern that it did not have sufficient capacity to conduct 
effective examinations of investment advisers with adequate 
frequency and set forth three options for addressing this concern: 
(1) assess user fees on SEC-registered investment advisers to 
fund their examinations by the SEC; (2) authorize one or more 
SROs to examine all SEC-registered investment advisers; and 
(3) authorize FINRA to examine dual registrants for compliance 
with the Advisers Act.20  The Section 914 Report identified 
significant drawbacks to the SRO model, notably including 
conflicts of interest inherent in self-regulation and the costs and 
funding involved. 
A 2011 GAO report studying a potential SRO for private 
fund advisers similarly found serious drawbacks to the SRO 
model, including its potential to  
(1) increase the overall cost of regulation by adding another 
layer of oversight; (2) create conflicts of interest, in part because 
of the possibility for self-regulation to favor the interests of the 
industry over the interests of investors and the public; and  
 
 
 
 
 
20 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER 
EXAMINATIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914study 
final.pdf [hereinafter SECTION 914 REPORT]. 
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(3) limit transparency and accountability, as the SRO would be 
accountable primarily to its members rather than to Congress 
or the public.21 
In addition, the report noted that the SRO model “expose[s] 
firms to duplicative examinations and costs.”22 
Consistent with these studies, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce focused, in a 2011 report, on the lack of accountability 
by certain nongovernmental policymakers with significant and 
growing influence, including FINRA: 
Despite their tremendous influence over the workings of the 
capital markets, these organizations are generally subject to few 
or none of the traditional checks and balances that constrain 
government agencies.  This means they are devoid of or 
substantially lack critical elements of governance and 
operational transparency, substantive and procedural standards 
for decision making, and meaningful due process mechanisms 
that allow market participants to object to their 
determinations.23 
The Chamber of Commerce report further observed that 
SROs are not bound by the congressional appropriations process 
or other comparable checks on their power.24 
Moreover, in a study required by section 967 of the Dodd-
Frank Act of the SEC’s structure, organization, and need for 
reforms (“BCG Section 967 Report”), BCG found numerous 
problems in the SEC’s relationship with SROs, including 
inadequate oversight and lack of standards to measure SRO 
effectiveness.  BCG found that  
 
 
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS: ALTHOUGH A 
SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT SEC OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD 
PRESENT CHALLENGES AND TRADE-OFFS 20 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11623.pdf. Section 416 of the Dodd-Frank Act required the GAO to study 
the feasibility of forming an SRO to provide primary oversight of private fund 
advisers. 
22 Id. 
23 U.S. CHAMBER’S CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CAPITAL 
MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 5 (2011) [hereinafter 
CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT], available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WEB.pdf. 
24 Id. at 14; see also BOS. CONSULTING GRP., INC., U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 25 (2011) 
[hereinafter BCG SECTION 967 REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2011/967study.pdf. 
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[g]iven the role of SROs in the regulatory framework, it is vital 
that the SEC develop both a clear set of standards for how SROs 
are to regulate and a means for assessing whether SROs are 
complying with those standards. . . . To strengthen its oversight 
of SROs, however, there are additional actions that can be 
taken . . . .25 
These actions include “[e]nhanc[ing] SRO disclosures regarding 
their regulatory operations”; “institut[ing] metrics to monitor 
SROs and minimum standards for their regulatory activities”; 
and “enhanc[ing] FINRA oversight.”26 
The BCG Section 967 Report observed that SROs are not 
accountable to the SEC and that the agency and SROs are not 
coordinating effectively.27  The report noted that if the SEC were 
to be funded adequately, rather than expanding the role of SROs, 
“there are strong arguments and global precedents to consolidate 
more regulatory activities from SROs into the national regulator.  
This will reduce real and/or perceived conflicts of interest that 
SROs may have, ensure greater control and visibility into market 
information for the SEC, and clarify the governance of securities 
regulation.”28 
Further, the BCG Section 967 Report found that the SEC 
has not been able to fully leverage and oversee SROs due to 
certain legal issues.  For example, FINRA has been reluctant to 
share examination and other information with the SEC, 
asserting that under the “state actor” doctrine, such sharing 
could cause FINRA to be deemed a government actor for various 
purposes, including the constitutional rights of defendants in 
enforcement actions.29 
H.R. 4624 did not adequately address any of these 
deficiencies in the SRO model.  For example, although it would 
have required the SRO to explain and respond to comments 
received regarding the costs and benefits of a proposed rule, the 
 
25 BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 134. The SEC selected BCG, a 
well-established consulting firm, to conduct the mandated study. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 25. 
28 Id. at 150. 
29 Id. at 65. Section (g)(2) of H.R. 4624 provides that the sharing of information 
by an adviser SRO with state or federal agencies will not be “construed to be the 
action of such an agency.” H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 2(g)(2) (2012). It is not clear 
whether this provision adequately addresses the constitutional analysis of state 
action. Further, while it permits the sharing of information, it does not compel an 
SRO to actually do so. Id. § 2. 
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bill did not require the SRO to affirmatively conduct its own cost-
benefit analysis.  Further, it would have provided no direct 
remedies for an SRO’s failure to adequately do so; interested 
parties would not have been able to bring suit against the SRO to 
ensure it conducted an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.  
Presumably, the SEC would have been required to determine 
that the SRO met its obligations to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis with respect to each of its proposals, but, historically, 
the SEC has not scrutinized SRO proposals in this way.  Such 
analysis by the SEC would have required substantial additional 
effort and resources. 
Similarly, the bill did not address the transparency typically 
lacking in the SRO model. An SRO designated pursuant to this 
legislation would not have been required to hold open meetings, 
to respond to Freedom of Information Act requests, or otherwise 
comply with the APA.  Although the bill required an SRO to 
submit an annual report, it did not require congressional or SEC 
oversight of the SRO’s budget or governance.30  Nor did it address 
concerns regarding due process protections during disciplinary 
hearings.31  The bill referenced notice-and-comment rulemaking 
under the APA but did not clearly apply the APA to an SRO’s 
consideration of its rules and rule changes, nor did it provide 
direct recourse if APA procedures were not followed.  In addition, 
the SEC’s oversight of SRO rulemaking may have been largely 
deferential:  The SEC would only need to find that the “proposed 
rule is consistent with the Exchange Act”; thus, the SEC was not 
required to pass judgment on the wisdom or merits of the SRO 
rules.32 
 
30 See SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 37 n.82 (comparing the PCAOB 
and FINRA governance models and noting that the PCAOB model requires SEC 
review of the annual budget and SEC appointment of board members); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-625, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY 16 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 GAO REPORT], available at 
http://gao.gov/assets/600/591222.pdf (noting that the SEC historically has not 
overseen FINRA’s budget, executive compensation, or governance issues). 
31 Fixing the Watchdog: Legislative Proposals To Improve and Enhance the 
Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
112 Cong. 77 (2011) (statement of Paul S. Atkins, Visiting Scholar, Am. Enter. Inst.) 
[hereinafter Atkins Testimony] (raising due process concerns regarding FINRA 
disciplinary hearings and noting that FINRA’s claim that it is not a “state actor” 
may deny defendants the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment). 
32 See BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 65 (noting limited nature of 
SEC’s review of SRO rules). 
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B. H.R. 4624 Would Have Resulted in Inconsistent Regulation 
and Regulatory Arbitrage 
The SRO regime mandated by H.R. 4624 would have been 
particularly inappropriate for investment advisers.  Indeed, the 
Section 914 Report catalogues numerous problems inherent in 
designating an SRO for the diverse investment advisory 
profession, including questions regarding governance, scope of 
authority, membership, conflicts of interest, and funding.  For 
example, the report observes that an adviser SRO presents 
unique governance issues given the diversity of the industry, 
because it will be challenging to ensure that no business model 
dominates or is given a competitive advantage by the SRO.33  The 
report also notes the concern that an SRO might have access to 
unique data and could seek to sell related services to the 
members it regulates. 
The Section 914 Report particularly notes the challenges 
presented in considering the scope of a potential SRO, stating 
that “[c]rafting exclusions for certain types of investment 
advisers could be difficult in practice because . . . many 
investment advisers have diverse client bases and business lines.  
Moreover, exclusions could provide opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage.”34  These challenges were amply demonstrated by  
H.R. 4624. 
H.R. 4624 evidently attempted to distinguish between 
“retail” investment advisory firms and “institutional” advisory 
firms; the former would have been subject to SRO requirements, 
while the latter would have remained solely under SEC 
regulation and oversight.35  The bill, however, did not 
appropriately draw these lines.36  Instead, the legislation’s 
exemptions from SRO requirements would have resulted in 
inconsistent treatment of investment advisers engaged in similar 
 
33 SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 35. 
34 Id. 
35 See H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012). 
36 There is no settled notion of a “retail” investment advisory firm. For example, 
an advisory firm may specialize in advising highly wealthy individuals—for 
example, with $2 million to $4 million in investable assets—and small or mid-sized 
businesses, pension plans, or endowments—for example, with $10 million to $20 
million in assets. Even though most would not consider such a firm to be “retail” 
oriented, it would not qualify for the SRO exemption under H.R. 4624 because its 
clients do not meet the “qualified purchaser” threshold—$5 million in investable 
assets for individuals and $25 million for entities. Id. 
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activities—including different registration and licensing 
requirements, different substantive regulations, and 
substantially different costs.  In addition to the SRO membership 
requirements, similar or identical advisers would have likely 
been subject to different disclosure, advertising, or supervision 
rules.  One set of advisers would have been subject only to SEC 
or state rules.  Another similar or identical set of advisers would 
have been subject to both SEC or state rules and a new set of 
technical, detailed “business conduct” rules.  These disparities 
were not justified by reasoned analysis. 
For example, the bill exempted from SRO membership any 
investment adviser if one or more of its clients was a mutual 
fund.37  This means that two nearly identical firms—same types 
of clients, assets under management, number of employees, 
investment style, revenues, profitability, and so forth—would 
have been treated differently if one firm had a single mutual 
fund client and the other did not.  An adviser that manages 
assets for high-net-worth individuals38 and one mutual fund 
would have been subject to a different set of rules than an 
adviser that manages assets only for high-net-worth clients. 
The ninety percent test in H.R. 4624 produced similarly 
anomalous results.39  An advisory firm that manages $150 billion 
in assets would have been exempt from the SRO requirements of 
H.R. 4624, even though a very large amount of assets—up to $15 
billion—could have been attributable to thousands of “retail” 
clients.  At the same time, an advisory firm that manages $150 
million in assets would have been subject to SRO requirements if 
only $16 million of its assets were attributable to relatively few 
“retail” clients.  Similarly, an adviser that manages assets, 
eleven percent of which were attributable to “retail” clients, 
would have been subject to different rules than an identical 
adviser that manages assets, nine percent of which were 
attributable to such clients.  Further, an adviser with one client 
base and investment strategy could have been subject to a 
 
37 Id. 
38 Most SEC-registered advisers—more than sixty percent—manage assets for 
high-net-worth individuals, according to data filed on Form ADV, Part 1, which 
defines “high net worth” individuals generally as those with $2 million or more in 
net worth excluding primary residence. Note that H.R. 4624 only includes ultra-
high-net-worth individuals—$5 million or more in investments—in its list of 
exempted clients. See id. 
39 Id. 
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different set of rules than an adviser with an identical client base 
and investment strategy simply because it was affiliated with an 
exempt adviser. 
The legislation likely would have encouraged regulatory 
arbitrage as firms restructured their businesses and/or dismissed 
individual and small business clients to avoid the costs and 
additional regulatory burdens of an SRO.  The bill would have 
driven business models and created structural incentives.  For 
example, many investment advisers that would have otherwise 
been subject to SRO regulation may have decided to establish or 
sub-advise a small mutual fund.  Similarly, advisers may have 
chosen to affiliate with other investment advisers that either 
advise a mutual fund or manage sufficient “institutional” assets 
to absorb the adviser within its aggregated ninety percent AUM 
threshold for exemption from SRO membership.  Advisers may 
have also avoided having the AUM of smaller clients attributed 
to them by structuring arrangements to sub-advise or provide 
model portfolio management to other advisers with those clients. 
These structural changes would have led to even more 
advisers remaining under SEC oversight than the bill 
contemplated and that have the same core business and clients 
as the advisers subject to SRO jurisdiction, further exacerbating 
the inconsistent regulation of similar businesses.  The Section 
914 Report identified similar concerns, noting that if an SRO is 
limited in its membership by clientele type or other 
characteristics, many advisers would still be left under the SEC’s 
oversight.40  The report observed that if the SEC and an SRO—or 
multiple SROs—shared regulatory authority over advisers, the 
regime would be vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage.41 
C. H.R. 4624 Was Not Cost Effective 
Establishing and maintaining a new SRO would impose 
substantial costs and burdens on investment advisers, with a 
disproportionate impact on smaller advisers.  It would 
exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the SEC’s resource 
constraints.  Further, it would create an unnecessary additional 
layer of regulation on advisers.  At a time when small businesses, 
including advisers, are becoming overwhelmed with new 
 
40 BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 34–35. 
41 Id. at 33. 
FINAL_TITTSWORTH 2/27/2014  6:25 PM 
490 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:477   
regulatory burdens, Congress should search for the least costly 
and most effective alternative to directly address the specific 
problem identified. 
1. The Bill Inappropriately Targeted Small Businesses with 
Additional Costs and Regulations 
H.R. 4624 would have disproportionately burdened 
thousands of small businesses that serve small and mid-sized 
investors with the costs of a duplicative and unnecessary layer of 
regulation and bureaucracy. 
The bill’s exemptions for advisers to mutual funds, private 
funds, “qualified purchasers,” and certain other clients meant 
that the vast majority of larger advisory firms would not be 
subject to SRO membership requirements.  Instead, thousands of 
smaller advisory firms would be required to shoulder the costs of 
establishing and maintaining an SRO.  As one commentator 
recently noted, H.R. 4624 “would impose a tax on small advisory 
businesses and, indirectly, the mainstream investors they advise, 
from which large advisors and their high net worth clients would 
be exempt.”42  Further, there is no evidence that imposing an 
SRO on these small firms, which represent a small fraction of the 
assets managed by advisers, would address the SEC’s resource 
constraints or uncover problems of substantial magnitude.43 
As discussed below, the costs on small business to establish 
and maintain an SRO would be substantial.  In addition, the 
impact of an additional layer of regulation and bureaucracy on 
these small firms would result in a significant and unnecessary 
burden.  Compliance with SEC regulations, as well as other 
applicable regulations—including Department of Labor 
regulations—currently requires significant dedication of 
resources by investment advisory firms.  If the substantial costs 
of this additional layer of regulation on these small businesses 
were passed on to investors, it would negatively affect retirement 
 
42 Mercer Bullard, The New Self-Regulator for Advisors: A Taxing Affair for 
Small Businesses and Small Investors, MORNINGSTAR (May 10, 2012), 
http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=553408&CN=brf295,http://ibd.morn
ingstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14;frmtId=12,%20brf295. 
43 Indeed, the stated poster-child for this legislation, Bernard Madoff’s 
brokerage firm, which had been subject to SEC and FINRA inspections for decades 
before it registered as an investment adviser in September 2006, would likely have 
been exempt from the SRO membership requirements in H.R. 4624. See id. 
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savings and investment.44  If pricing resistance is such that all of 
the costs cannot be passed on, the costs would have a significant 
impact on job retention and creation in these small businesses—
in which human resources account for the vast portion of the cost 
structure. 
2. The Bill Would Have Exacerbated, Not Ameliorated, the 
SEC’s Resource Issues 
H.R. 4624 would not have eased the SEC’s resource 
constraints but would have instead placed additional burdens on 
the agency.  Appropriate government oversight is required in any 
SRO structure and thus requires dedication of significant 
government resources.  The Section 914 Report observed that an 
SRO would not free all of the resources the SEC currently 
devotes to investment adviser examinations:  
Commission resources would still be required to oversee the 
operations of any SRO by . . . conducting oversight examinations 
of the SRO, considering appeals from sanctions imposed by the 
SRO, and approving SRO fee and rule changes.  Substantial 
resources of both [the inspection staff and the policy staff] are 
currently employed to oversee the activities of FINRA.45   
For example, the SEC employs more than 300 staff to examine, 
and oversee FINRA’s examination program of, broker-dealers—in 
addition to close to fifty inspection staff who currently focus on 
FINRA and other SRO oversight.46  Additional, substantial SEC 
expenditures will be required in the future just to effectively 
oversee the current SROs under its jurisdiction.47 
These current challenges would be magnified not only by the 
extension of SRO jurisdiction to SEC-registered advisers but also 
to thousands of state-registered advisers.  The SEC would be 
obligated to exercise appropriate supervision over the SRO’s 
activities regarding thousands of state-registered advisers with 
respect to which the SEC currently has no regulatory 
 
44 See, e.g., BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 151 (noting potential 
for SRO costs to be passed on “to investors in a way that makes investing 
unaffordable for many”). 
45 SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 30; see also Bullard, supra note 42. 
46 BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 64; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS A-15 (2011) [hereinafter 
SECTION 913 REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913study 
final.pdf. 
47 BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 39–41.  
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responsibility.  As a result, H.R. 4624 likely would have 
exacerbated the SEC’s resource constraints.  Indeed, the 
legislation may have resulted in a double layer of expenditures—
investment advisers would have been required to pay substantial 
fees to an SRO for regulation and the SEC would have had to re-
allocate substantial funds to fulfill extensive additional oversight 
responsibilities for the SRO. 
In addition, this bill would have required the SEC to conduct 
a firm-by-firm analysis of which companies under common 
control should have been subject to SRO jurisdiction and which 
should have remained solely under SEC jurisdiction due to their 
affiliations with other entities solely under SEC jurisdiction.  
There are almost 4,000 SEC-registered advisers with affiliated 
investment advisers.48  The analysis of these firms would have 
consumed substantial SEC resources, not only initially, but on an 
ongoing basis as firms affiliated or changed their affiliations over 
time. 
Former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has testified 
regarding the strain that review of SRO rulemaking places on 
the agency.  She stated that the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s imposition of new procedural requirements 
with respect to the SEC’s processing of proposed SRO rule 
changes has placed further demands on an already complex and 
resource-intensive process.  The volume of annual requests has 
increased by over 80 percent in the last five years, with the 
Commission receiving over 2,000 requests for approval or 
guidance in 2011.49   
The addition of oversight duties for an adviser SRO with 
rulemaking authority would only compound these concerns and 
further strain SEC resources. 
 
 
48 See Norm Champ, Deputy Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & 
Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Speech at the New York City Bar: What SEC 
Registration Means for Hedge Fund Advisors (May 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch051112nc.htm. 
49 Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 112th Cong. 63 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities 
and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter SEC 2012 Testimony]. 
FINAL_TITTSWORTH 2/27/2014  6:25 PM 
2013] INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND USER FEES 493 
3. An SRO Would Result in Unnecessary and Costly Regulation 
The current regulatory framework for investment advisers is 
robust and protects investors.  There is no evidence that a second 
layer of regulation imposed by an SRO is needed.  Investment 
advisers are comprehensively regulated through the rules and 
requirements promulgated by the SEC and are subject to 
inspections and oversight by the agency.  Investment advisers 
are subject to an overarching fiduciary duty requiring them to act 
in their clients’ best interest and disclose all material facts and 
conflicts of interest. 
Pursuant to the Advisers Act, as a fiduciary, “an investment 
adviser must at all times act in its clients’ best interests, and its 
conduct will be measured against a higher standard of conduct 
than that used for mere commercial transactions.”50  In practical 
terms, fiduciary duty means that, in the course of providing 
advice to clients, advisers must disclose all material information 
and conflicts of interest to their clients, including the fees that 
they charge, how they plan to recommend securities to clients, 
and any material disciplinary information involving the firms or 
their investment personnel.  Moreover, as fiduciaries, advisers 
must treat their clients fairly and not favor one client over 
another, especially if they would somehow benefit from favoring 
one particular client or type of client.  Most important, whenever 
the interests of investment advisers differ from those of their 
clients, advisers must explain the conflict to the clients and act to 
mitigate or eliminate it, ensuring they act in the interests of the 
client and not for their own benefit. 
This well-established standard has been consistently 
interpreted and applied by the SEC and the courts to require 
investment advisers to serve their clients with the highest duty 
of loyalty and duty of care.51  Among the specific obligations that 
flow from an adviser’s fiduciary duty are the following: (1) the 
duty to have an adequate, reasonable basis for its investment 
advice; (2) the duty to seek best execution for clients’ securities 
transactions where the adviser directs such transactions; (3) the 
duty to render advice that is suitable to clients’ needs, objectives, 
and financial circumstances; (4) the duty not to subrogate clients’ 
 
50 Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Regulation of Investment Advisers § 2:33 
(2013); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 
(1963). 
51 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 194. 
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interests to its own; (5) the duty not to use client assets for itself; 
(6) the duty to maintain client confidentiality; and (7) the duty to 
make full and fair disclosure to clients of all material facts, 
particularly regarding conflicts of interest.52 
In addition, all SEC-registered investment advisers are 
required to submit detailed registration information on Form 
ADV, Part 1, which is publicly available, and update it at least 
annually and promptly for material changes.53  Advisers are also 
required to provide clients with a plain English brochure and 
brochure supplement, Form ADV, Part 2.54  The brochures are 
filed with the SEC and are publicly available.  The brochure and 
brochure supplement provide extensive information regarding 
each investment adviser and key advisory personnel.  Advisers 
are required to disclose detailed information about their firms, 
including: the educational and business background of each 
person who determines or provides advice to clients; the adviser’s 
basic fee schedule, including how fees are charged and whether 
such fees are negotiable; types of investments and methods of 
securities analysis used; how the adviser reviews client accounts; 
the adviser’s other business activities; material financial 
arrangements with a wide variety of entities; certain referral 
arrangements; and numerous other disclosures that describe 
activities that may pose potential conflicts of interest with the 
adviser’s clients, including specific disclosures relating to trading 
and brokerage practices.  In addition, advisers to private funds 
must soon submit extensive information to the SEC about their 
holdings, counterparty exposures, performance, and leverage on 
the new Form PF. 
 
52 See Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060, 
2010 WL 2957506, at *1 (Aug. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 279); 
Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial 
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 1406, 59 FR 13,464 n.3 (proposed Mar. 16, 1994) (noting duty of full disclosure of 
conflicts of interest, duty of loyalty, duty of best execution, and duty of care); 
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension 
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a 
Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 
1987 WL 112702, at *7–8 (Oct. 8, 1987) (discussing fiduciary duties); see also Capital 
Gains, 375 U.S. at 191, 194. 
53 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf. 
54 See id. at 3. 
FINAL_TITTSWORTH 2/27/2014  6:25 PM 
2013] INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND USER FEES 495 
Investment advisers also are subject to a variety of 
requirements relating to proxy voting, books and records, insider 
trading, custody, privacy, best execution, advertising, and 
referral arrangements.  Importantly, the assets managed by 
investment advisers must be held at registered broker-dealers or 
banks.55  Investment advisers must adopt written codes of ethics, 
which must set forth standards of conduct expected of advisory 
personnel and address conflicts that arise from personal trading 
by advisory personnel.  Advisers also must adopt and implement 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent 
violations of the Advisers Act, review the policies and procedures 
at least annually to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of 
their implementation, and designate a chief compliance officer 
responsible for administering the policies and procedures.  Under 
these rules, advisers have the flexibility to tailor their policies 
and procedures to the nature of their business and clientele. 
This regulatory framework is appropriate to the nature, 
scope, and risks of the investment advisory business.  No 
additional layer of regulation is warranted.  Further, SRO-style 
business conduct rules are typically very detailed command-and-
control requirements that seek to impose a one-size-fits-all 
solution for various legal and regulatory issues.  In contrast to 
the principles-based SEC framework, these SRO “check-the-box” 
regulations do not lend themselves to the widely divergent 
community of advisers. 
In addition, the SEC staff’s Section 914 Report raised 
concerns that subjecting advisers to an SRO could lead to 
inconsistent interpretations and applications of the Advisers Act.  
The report noted that the possibility of multiple SROs—which, 
though unlikely, H.R. 4624 would have permitted—could result 
in SROs over time developing “different approaches to applying 
the Advisers Act and their own rules to similar activities,” 
prevention of which would require “vigorous oversight” by the 
 
55 In response to the Madoff case, the SEC strengthened the “custody” rule to 
enhance protection of client assets. See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission: Evaluating Present Reforms and Future Challenges: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 111th Cong. 
59 (2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange 
Commission) (“The rule leverages our own resources by relying on independent, 
third-party accountants to confirm client assets and review custody controls in 
situations where the possibility for misappropriation of client assets is most acute 
because of the adviser’s possession of, or control over, client assets.”). 
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SEC.56  The report also highlighted the difficulties involved in 
requiring the SEC to oversee an SRO that has enforcement 
authority with respect to a broad range of state regulatory 
requirements, which would be the case if H.R. 4624 was enacted. 
D. The IAA Opposes Designation of FINRA as an SRO for 
Advisers 
The H.R. 4624 legislation appears to have been designed to 
favor FINRA as the presumptively designated SRO for advisers.  
The bill was modeled on, and largely replicated, the Maloney Act, 
which established the SRO structure pursuant to which FINRA 
now operates.  FINRA—a self-described “non-governmental 
regulator” with 3,000 employees and more than $1.1 billion in 
total revenues—was designed and developed to oversee broker-
dealer activity.57  FINRA has clearly indicated its desire to 
extend its jurisdiction to include oversight and regulation of 
investment advisers.58  The IAA strongly opposes extending 
FINRA’s jurisdiction to investment advisers due to its lack of 
adviser expertise, lack of accountability, lack of transparency, 
excessive costs,59 and questionable track record.60 
 
56 SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 33. 
57 See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW AND 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 48, 78 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA 2010 YEAR IN 
REVIEW], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/ 
documents/corporate/p123836.pdf. 
58 See, e.g., Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor 
Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National 
Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 176 
(2009) (statement of Richard Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority). 
59 See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT OF THE AMERIVET DEMAND 
COMMITTEE OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, INC. 86 (2010), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/ 
p122217.pdf (FINRA benchmarks its senior management compensation based on 
levels in the financial services industry and states that “non-profit organizations and 
governmental agencies were inadequate comparables for compensation purposes.”). 
As disclosed in FINRA’s 2010 Annual Report, salaries and bonuses for FINRA’s top 
executives average $1,057,787. See FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 57, at 
18. 
60 See, e.g., Letter from Project on Gov’t Oversight to Representative Spencer 
Bachus, Chairman, and Representative Barney Frank, Ranking Member, House 
Comm. on Fin. Servs. 1 (May 29, 2012), available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sro-
letter-20120529.pdf; Letter from Project on Gov’t Oversight to Chairman and 
Ranking Member, Congress (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.pogo.org/our-
work/letters/2010/er-fra-20100223-2.html; see also The Madoff Investment Securities 
Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns and the Need for Reform: Hearing Before 
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Designation of FINRA as the adviser SRO would result in 
conflicts of interest, with potential adverse competitive 
implications for advisers.61  Broker-dealers are the “sell side” of 
the securities industry, while advisers are the “buy side.”  The 
potential for conflict is demonstrated by FINRA’s explicit 
advocacy of extending the broker-dealer regulatory framework to 
advisers.62  Conflicts may arise in that broker-dealers engage in 
arms-length transactions with investment advisers in various 
capacities, including as service providers, counterparties, market 
makers, and syndicators and underwriters.  An association 
representing private fund advisers has observed that these 
competing relationships “would present challenges to an SRO 
responsible for overseeing these types of firms fairly and 
equitably.”63 
 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 60 (2009) 
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School) 
(noting that Madoff’s advisory activity was within the NASD’s and FINRA’s 
jurisdiction); FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT OF THE 2009 SPECIAL REVIEW 
COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE STANFORD AND 
MADOFF SCHEMES 5 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ 
corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/p120078.pdf (“FINRA examiners did come 
across several facts worthy of inquiry associated with the Madoff scheme that, with 
the benefit of hindsight, should have been pursued.”); Letter from Mari-Anne 
Pisarri, Pickard & Djinis LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
5 (Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Pickard and Djinis Letter] (“There is no question that 
the NASD/FINRA had both the authority and responsibility to investigate Madoff’s 
fraudulent conduct.”); Stewart D. Aaron et al., Arnold & Porter LLP, SRO 
Regulation in the Dodd-Frank Era, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/236796/sro-regulation-in-the-dodd-frank-era (“Public 
perceptions about the effectiveness of self-regulation were not helped by events such 
as FINRA’s failure to detect Lehman Brothers’ controversial Repo 105 accounting, or 
FINRA’s declaration of Bear Stearns’ capital adequacy on the very day Bear Stearns 
collapsed.”). 
61 Alleged Stanford Financial Group Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns 
and the Need for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Onnig H. Dombalagian, Professor, Tulane 
University) (“The conflicts of interest between the brokerage industry and the 
investment advisory industry . . . are too great for FINRA to exercise a meaningful 
role in the oversight of investment advisers.”). 
62 See Letter from Marc Menchel, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fin. 
Indus. Regulatory Auth., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/ 
@guide/documents/industry/p121983.pdf; see also Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Feb. 11, 2005); Letter 
from Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 
(Apr. 4, 2005). 
63 Letter from Richard H. Baker, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Managed 
Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 10 (Dec. 16, 2010) 
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FINRA’s lack of accountability makes it particularly ill-
suited to extend its reach to investment advisers.  The BCG 
Section 967 Report repeatedly stated that SROs are not 
accountable to the SEC and that the agency and SROs were not 
coordinating effectively.64  In this regard, it stated that FINRA 
“merits particular attention given its size and scope.”65  For 
example, the report observes that “FINRA conducts extensive 
risk assessment activities in support of its examinations,” but 
does not share its analysis with the SEC.66 
Further, in a report released in May 2012, the GAO found 
that neither the SEC nor FINRA had conducted any formal 
retroactive review of FINRA rules to assess their actual impact 
after implementation.67  The report also found that the SEC 
historically has not conducted oversight of FINRA’s governance, 
conflicts of interest, funding, executive compensation, or 
cooperation with state regulators.  Further, FINRA recently 
opposed an attempt by its members to subject FINRA’s 
rulemakings and amendments to economic and cost-benefit 
analysis.68 
According to the Chamber of Commerce Report discussed 
above, FINRA’s members no longer have a meaningful role in 
establishing its policies and priorities, and the organization is not 
moving toward greater transparency and accountability.69  The 
 
[hereinafter MFA Section 914 Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-
title-ix/enhancing-ia-examinations/enhancingiaexaminations-28.pdf.  
64 BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 65–67, 237–38. 
65 Id. at 66. 
66 Id. at 67. 
67 2012 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 12–15. 
68 See, e.g., Letter from Stephanie M. Dumont, Senior Vice President & Dir. of 
Capital Mkts. Policy, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 n.27 (Dec. 23, 2011) (“After all, no SRO is required to 
undertake an economic analysis of its rule proposals . . . . [T]here is no statutory or 
Exchange Act Rule requirement to undertake an economic analysis because a 
commenter makes such demand and we are unaware of any requirement on the part 
of the Commission to oblige such commenters.”). 
69 CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 23, at 23; see also Brief for the Cato 
Institute and Competitive Enterprise Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 6–7, Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 132 
S.Ct. 1093 (2012) (No. 11-381), 2011 WL 5128121, at *6–7 [hereinafter Cato Brief] 
(“Constitutional accountability typically stems from either of two sources: political 
accountability or legal accountability. Here, political accountability is de minimis 
due to the layers of authority separating FINRA from executive branch officers. 
Unfortunately, legal accountability—judicial review—has also eroded, leaving 
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report states that “[t]ransparency into FINRA’s governance, 
compensation, and budgeting practices is extremely limited and 
superficial.  Furthermore, FINRA is not subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act or the APA, nor is it required to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis when it engages in rulemaking or exercises 
its policy-making functions.”70  Unlike the SEC, FINRA is not 
subject to the Government in the Sunshine Act and its board of 
directors does not hold open meetings.  On the other hand, 
FINRA claims that it is a governmental or quasi-governmental 
regulator when it suits its interests, such as claiming sovereign 
immunity when sued.  Similarly, FINRA is not accountable to 
any entity with respect to its budget—neither to Congress nor to 
the SEC.71 
Because of these numerous shortcomings, the Cato Institute 
recently concluded that “FINRA’s extra-constitutional operation 
has fostered significant policy failures including agency capture, 
lax regulation, and biased arbitration. . . . The proliferation of 
substantial financial industry scandals over the past decade is 
evidence that FINRA is, at best, a hands-off regulator and, at 
worst, a corrupt and self-serving company.”72  These concerns are 
underscored by FINRA’s recent settlement of civil charges by the 
SEC for repeatedly misleading the SEC by altering documents 
sought by the agency during routine inspections.73 
III. USER FEES PAID BY SEC-REGISTERED ADVISERS ARE 
PREFERABLE TO AN SRO 
Congress should consider appropriate legislation authorizing 
the SEC to require that federally registered investment advisers 
pay user fees, rather than subjecting them to an SRO.  Such user 
fees should be dedicated for the sole purpose of enhancing the 
SEC’s investment adviser inspection program over and above 
current inspection levels.  Legislation authorizing investment 
 
FINRA and similarly situated SROs almost entirely unaccountable.” (citations 
omitted)). 
70 CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 23, at 23. 
71 See Atkins Testimony, supra note 31, at 10–11; 2012 GAO REPORT, supra note 
30, at 21. 
72 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 9, 11. 
73 David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Accuses Brokers Group of Deception, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 28, 2011, at A12; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Orders FINRA To 
Improve Internal Compliance Policies and Procedures (Oct. 27, 2011), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-227.htm. 
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adviser user fees should include provisions that will provide for 
appropriate reporting and audit requirements to enable 
Congress, the public, and the investment advisory community to 
ensure that the funds are being used for their intended purposes 
and to provide accountability and transparency.  User fees would 
be a more effective and efficient means than an SRO to enhance 
the oversight of investment advisers and would be less costly.  
Investment advisers strongly support oversight by the SEC, 
which continues to improve its examination program. 
A. User Fees Are More Effective and Efficient Than an SRO 
User fees would be far more effective and efficient in 
enhancing examinations of advisers than establishing an 
unnecessary additional layer of bureaucracy and cost.  The SEC 
has more than seven decades of experience regulating and 
overseeing the investment advisory profession.  Moreover, the 
SEC is directly accountable to Congress and the public with 
regard to its budget and performance.  As SEC Commissioner 
Luis Aguilar stated in 2009: 
  I do not believe that the answer is to create another SRO – 
particularly when it would be one without any experience in 
dealing with the investment advisory industry and the Advisers 
Act regulatory tradition.  Moreover, this current crisis has 
illustrated the dangers of regulatory fragmentation where the 
primary regulator is not able to quickly obtain, assess, and 
analyze information.  Now is not the time to fragment even 
more, but to consolidate and employ smart regulation.   
  The SEC is the only public agency charged with regulating 
our capital markets and maintaining a keen sense of the entire 
market on behalf of investors.  To create another regulator at 
this time without the experience in regulating a principle-based 
system of regulation would be too costly for the industry and the 
public in terms of both dollars and investor protection.74 
 
 
74 See Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC’s Oversight of 
the Adviser Industry Bolsters Investor Protection (May 7, 2009) (also noting that the 
SEC is “the only entity with experience overseeing investment advisers, an industry 
governed by the Advisers Act, which is based on a principles-based regime. By 
contrast, broker-dealer SROs primarily regulate through the use of very detailed, 
specific sets of rules and are not well versed in the oversight of principles-based 
regulation”). 
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The Section 914 Report provides many reasons why user fees 
would be a preferable approach to an SRO or other options.  The 
Section 914 Report notes that investment adviser user fees would 
provide a stable source of funding that would be scalable to 
increases or decreases in the adviser population and could be set 
at a level designed to achieve the SEC’s desired examination 
frequency and scope.75 
User fees are already an important source of funding for 
inspections and examinations of other financial institutions and 
regulated entities by many federal agencies, including the 
Comptroller of the Currency.76  In addition, the SEC previously 
supported user fees in testimony related to legislation under 
consideration in 1990.  Further, investment advisers already pay 
user fees to support the Investment Adviser Registration 
Depository (“IARD”), the electronic system through which 
investment advisers make filings with state and federal 
regulators.77  The IARD system therefore provides an existing 
infrastructure to collect user fees at a small marginal cost. 
The Section 914 Report found that the user fee option would 
permit the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (“OCIE”) to improve the effectiveness of its 
examinations through long-term strategic planning that would 
better use modern technology and its workforce.  A stable source 
of funding would permit use of technology-based solutions that 
can take years to develop and implement.78  Stable resources 
would also provide the examination program with increased 
flexibility to react to emerging risks and better target staffing 
and strategic resources as appropriate.  The staff observed that 
knowledge gained from the investment adviser examination 
program would continue to greatly assist in gathering the 
 
75 SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 25. 
76 The Section 914 Report notes that: 
user fees fund inspections of banks conducted by the Office of Comptroller 
of the Currency, examinations of credit unions by the National Credit 
Union Administration, inspections of nuclear facilities by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, inspections of national marine fisheries by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and quality 
examinations of agricultural commodities and processing plants by the 
Department of Agriculture. 
Id. at 25–26. 
77 Id. at 26. 
78 Id. at 26–28. 
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intelligence and expertise critical to the regulatory process.79  
Further, ongoing improvements to the examination program 
could be further leveraged with the funding provided by user 
fees.  The SRO model would not provide such benefits to the SEC. 
Indeed, in its analysis of the various options to increase 
examinations, the Section 914 Report found that user fees 
present the greatest number of advantages and the least number 
of disadvantages.80  The report observes that “imposing user fees 
would avoid the difficult scope of authority, membership, 
governance, and funding issues raised by an SRO . . . . It would 
avoid the need for the Commission to use resources to staff an 
expanded SRO examination program.”81  The Section 914 Report 
also noted that funding from adviser user fees would give the 
SEC greater flexibility and may be a less costly option than 
establishing an SRO. 
Indeed, the report notes that in many ways, user fees may be 
a smarter, more efficient use of funds.82  Allowing OCIE to charge 
user fees would empower it to build on the expertise and 
infrastructure it has already established in examining advisers.83  
Within the SEC, OCIE examination staff benefit from close 
working relationships with other SEC legal and policy staff.84  In 
contrast, an SRO would be an isolated cost center that would 
require extra resources and personnel to build even a 
preliminary infrastructure. 
Further, as noted above, an SRO would still require an 
increase in the SEC’s management and coordination costs in 
order to oversee the SRO.85  In fact, the SEC staff expressed 
concern that if SRO oversight were mandated, it may one day be 
 
79 Id. at 27 n.47. 
80 See, e.g., ELISSE B. WALTER, STATEMENT ON STUDY ENHANCING INVESTMENT 
ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 7 (2011) (noting with disappointment that the “study 
attributes virtually no disadvantages to the user fee option, but many disadvantages 
to the SRO and FINRA dual registrant options”). 
81 SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 29. 
82 See id. at 27; see also Oversight of the Mutual Fund Industry: Ensuring 
Market Stability and Investor Confidence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 200 (2011) 
(statement of Paul Schott Stevens, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Investment Company Institute); MFA Section 914 Letter, supra note 63; Letter from 
David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir., Investor Adviser Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter IAA Section 914 Letter]. 
83 See SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 28, 30. 
84 See id. at 28. 
85 See id. at 27. 
FINAL_TITTSWORTH 2/27/2014  6:25 PM 
2013] INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND USER FEES 503 
underfunded because there is no certainty that the level of 
resources available to the Commission over time would provide 
for effective oversight.86  In addition, with the user fee option, 
“the chance that inconsistencies would emerge in interpretation 
or application of the Advisers Act and its rules between a third-
party examining body (such as an SRO) and the statute’s and 
rules’ primary administrator (the Commission) would be 
eliminated.”87 
B. User Fees Would Be Less Costly Than an SRO 
In considering legislation to enhance investment adviser 
examinations, Congress should consider the costs and benefits of 
the various alternatives.  The IAA is not aware of any analysis or 
empirical data demonstrating that the benefits associated with 
H.R. 4624 would have outweighed the costs.  To the contrary, 
there is compelling evidence that the costs of outsourcing 
regulation and oversight of thousands of investment advisers to 
an SRO—likely FINRA—would be far greater than the 
comparable costs of enhancing the SEC’s inspection program. 
In this regard, a study commissioned by the IAA, the 
Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., the 
Financial Planning Association, the National Association of 
Personal Financial Advisors, and TD Ameritrade Institutional, is 
highly relevant.88  These groups commissioned BCG to produce a 
report determining the costs of the options outlined in the 
Section 914 Report on enhancing investment adviser 
examinations. 
The December 2011 BCG economic analysis analyzed the 
costs of the following: (1) increasing the level of SEC 
examinations; (2) set-up and operation of an investment adviser 
SRO by FINRA; and (3) set-up and operation of an entirely new 
SRO for advisers.  BCG’s economic analysis was based on the 
assumption that advisers would be examined by the SEC or an 
SRO on an average of once every four years. 
The economic analysis found that the costs to investment 
advisers of adequately funding the SEC to conduct additional 
examinations would be far less than paying FINRA or another 
 
86 See id. at 28. 
87 Id. 
88 The December 2011 BCG economic analysis is appended to this testimony for 
the record. See generally BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 2.  
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SRO to do so.89  It underscores the conclusion that the best and 
most efficient way to enhance investment adviser oversight is to 
ensure that the SEC has sufficient resources. 
Key findings of the BCG economic analysis include the 
following.  First, creating an SRO for advisers would likely cost 
at least twice as much as funding an enhanced SEC examination 
program.90  The incremental cost of the SEC hiring the additional 
adviser examiners needed to increase the inspection rate for 
advisers to, on average, once every four years—including 
supporting expenses—would be $100 million to $110 million per 
year.91  The total cost of an enhanced SEC examination 
program—including both the costs of the existing program and 
the incremental costs related to hiring the additional 
examiners—is projected to be $240 million to $270 million per 
year.92  In contrast, a FINRA SRO—examination, enforcement, 
and SEC oversight—is projected to cost $550 million to $610 
million per year; and a new SRO is projected to cost $610 million 
to $670 million per year.93 
Second, the cost savings to the SEC of creating an SRO is 
likely to be minimal because the SEC would need to spend 
significant resources—$90 million to $105 million per year—
overseeing an SRO.94  Third, the startup costs of an SRO alone—
$200 million to $310 million—could fund an enhanced SEC 
examination program for an entire year—$240 million to $270 
million.95  Fourth, shifting primary oversight of dually registered 
broker-dealers and investment advisers—those regulated by both 
the SEC and FINRA—to FINRA alone is not expected to result in 
significant costs savings to the SEC.96 
Further, as discussed above, H.R. 4624 was structured such 
that the substantial costs of establishing an SRO for advisers 
would be imposed on small businesses rather than being shared 
across the industry, as assumed in the BCG economic analysis.  
In other words, if the bill had been enacted, the fixed costs of 
establishing an SRO with rulemaking, examination, and 
 
89 See id. at 12. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. at 13. 
95 See id. at 12. 
96 See id. at 7. 
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enforcement authority would have been assessed on a smaller 
group of advisers with limited resources.  Accordingly, the actual 
costs incurred by these small businesses would have been even 
higher than under an industry-wide or user fee approach. 
BCG released an addendum to this analysis on May 10, 2012 
to discuss FINRA’s estimate—a one-and-a-half page document 
titled “Investment Estimate for FINRA IA SRO”—that was 
released concurrent with the introduction of H.R. 4624 on April 
25.97  According to BCG’s analysis, FINRA’s estimate of the cost 
to set up, operate, and oversee a SRO for investment advisers 
greatly underestimated the overhead costs and overestimated 
investment adviser examiner productivity.98 
C. Investment Advisers and Other Commenters Strongly 
Support Continued SEC Oversight of Advisers 
In addition to the IAA, a number of other organizations and 
commenters have voiced numerous concerns about establishing 
an SRO for investment advisers and have expressed support for 
ensuring adequate resources for the SEC.99  For example, the 
 
97 See Press Release, Inv. Adviser Ass’n, FINRA’s Cost Estimates Challenged: 
Leading Financial Services Organizations Respond to FINRA’s Estimates (May 10, 
2012), available at https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/ 
PressReleases/PressCur/120510prs.pdf. 
98 Specifically, BCG found that: (1) FINRA’s estimate omits the cost of SEC 
oversight of the IAN SRO ($90 to $100 million) and the cost of enforcement ($60 to 
$70 million), both of which are required by H.R. 4624; (2) FINRA’s estimate of $12 to 
$15 million in setup costs does not include staff costs incurred during the twelve-
month setup period, specifically the cost of examiners and support staff. Rather, 
FINRA only includes these expenses as part of its ongoing investment once the SRO 
is up and running. This omission accounts for $180 to $230 million of the difference 
between the BCG and FINRA estimates; (3) FINRA’s estimate of the ongoing annual 
cost of examining 14,500 IA firms once every four years assumes that FINRA’s IA 
examiners would be able to nearly double the productivity rate of SEC IA examiners 
by performing five or more examinations per examiner per year. This compares to 
SEC IA examiner productivity of 3.0, and FINRA broker-dealer examiner 
productivity of 2.8. This productivity assumption accounts for $150 to $170 million of 
the difference between the BCG and FINRA estimates; and (4) FINRA’s estimate 
does not include overhead costs in its estimate of $150 to $155 million of ongoing 
annual investment. Overhead costs account for $135 to $140 million of the difference 
between the BCG and FINRA estimates. Id. 
99 See, e.g., Pickard and Djinis Letter, supra note 60, at 4 (“While the costs of 
designating one or more SROs for investment advisers are clear the benefits are less 
so. In analyzing the question of benefits, we submit that the number of adviser 
examinations that an SRO could conduct is less important than the quality of those 
examinations. SROs’ lack of familiarity with the extensive regulatory regime 
imposed on advisers raises serious concerns about such organizations’ ability to 
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Managed Funds Association (“MFA”) has expressed multiple 
concerns about an SRO for investment advisers100 and its support 
for ensuring that the Commission has adequate resources, 
including appropriate user fees.101  Similarly, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) has 
expressed its strong opposition to an SRO, and FINRA in 
particular,102 and instead indicated its support for providing 
appropriate resources to the SEC, including user fees.103  The 
Alternative Investment Management Association (“AIMA”) has 
opposed an SRO and instead supports “full and proper regulation 
and oversight of investment advisers by the Commission and 
believes the Commission should be given adequate resources to 
fulfil its objectives of protecting investors, maintaining fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets and facilitating capital 
formation.”104  The North American Securities Administrators 
Association (“NASAA”) has expressed its strong opposition to 
outsourcing important governmental regulatory functions to a 
 
oversee the implementation of that regime effectively. Moreover, as the Madoff and 
Stanford scandals show, SRO examinations can be ineffective even where the 
activities being examined are squarely within the purview of the organization’s 
jurisdiction and expertise.”). 
100 See MFA Section 914 Letter, supra note 63, at 2 (“[A]n SRO would lack 
experience in regulating private fund managers, create inconsistent regulation for 
investment advisers, face difficult conflicts of interest, increase regulatory costs, and 
ultimately diminish the quality of regulatory oversight of the industry.”). 
101 See Letter from Richard H. Baker, President and Chief Exec. Officer, 
Managed Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Sept. 
22, 2010) (“[W]e would support appropriate fees on investment advisers to help 
ensure that OCIE has the resources they need to conduct examinations of the 
investment adviser industry.”). 
102 See Letter from Barry C. Melancon, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Am. 
Inst. of CPAs, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Nov. 24, 2010) 
(“We strongly oppose the creation of a self‐regulatory organization (SRO) for 
investment advisers. An SRO is inherently conflicted and is not the right answer for 
regulation of investment advisers. We believe that FINRA would bring a 
broker‐dealer perspective, and bias, to investment adviser examinations and that its 
rules‐based, check‐the‐box approach is not conducive to adequate regulation of the 
investment advisory profession nor is it in the public’s best interest.”). 
103 Id. (“AICPA strongly believes that the principles-based regulatory approach 
of the Investment Advisers Act and its related rules should continue to govern 
investment advisers and further, that regulatory oversight remain exclusively with 
the SEC and/or states. Providing the SEC with resources to properly enforce their 
rules, even if it means assessing additional fees on investment advisers, is the best 
solution for investment advisers and the public.”). 
104 See Letter from Mary Richardson, Dir. of Regulatory & Tax Dep’t, Alt. Inv. 
Mgmt. Ass’n, to the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n and Gov’t Accountability Office 3 (Jan. 12, 
2011). 
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third party.105  Further, the Financial Planning Coalition has 
noted the many drawbacks to an SRO for investment advisers, 
and to FINRA in particular,106 and stated its support for 
continuation of the SEC’s regulation and oversight of the 
advisory profession.107 
D. The SEC Improved Its Investment Adviser Examination 
Program and Should Continue Its Oversight of All SEC-
Registered Advisers 
The IAA has consistently supported the SEC’s efforts to 
strengthen its examination program for investment advisers.  
The IAA testified in 2011 before the Committee on Financial 
Services in support of efforts to strengthen the SEC’s investment 
adviser examination program conducted by OCIE.108  Adequate  
 
 
105 See Letter from David L. Massey, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., 
and Deputy Sec. Adm’r, State of N.C., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 2–3 (Nov. 22, 2010) (“[I]nvestment adviser regulation is a governmental 
function that should not be outsourced to a private, third-party organization that 
does not have expertise or experience with investment adviser regulation. Securities 
regulation in general and investment adviser regulation in particular is best left 
with governmental regulators that are transparent and directly accountable to the 
investing public. One can readily conclude that the designation of an SRO for the 
oversight of investment advisers, with its attendant direct and indirect costs, its 
opaque structure and attendant lack of accountability and transparency, would 
outweigh any perceived benefits to the investing public.”). 
106 See Letter from Kevin R. Keller, Chief Exec. Officer, CFP Board, et al., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Dec. 16, 2010) (“Creating a 
new layer of bureaucracy and cost in order to improve the frequency of investment 
adviser examinations is not a wise use of limited regulatory resources. Aside from 
the additional infrastructure costs involved with creating an SRO oversight 
structure for investment advisers, outsourcing oversight could result in inconsistent 
or redundant regulation and enforcement (as both the SRO and the Commission 
interpret and enforce the relevant rules).”). 
107 Id. at 3 (“We believe it would be much quicker and more efficient to leverage 
the Commission’s existing investment adviser examination staff, which is already 
fully conversant with all of the legal and regulatory issues that pertain to 
investment advisers, than to create an entirely new SRO from scratch to oversee 
investment advisers.”). 
108 See Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir., Inv. Adviser Ass’n, to Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 29, 2009), available at 
https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/CS09/comment090
729A.pdf. See generally Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-
Dealers and Legislative Proposals To Improve Investment Adviser Oversight: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2011) (statement of David G. Tittsworth, Exec. 
Dir., Inv. Adviser Ass’n) [hereinafter IAA 2011 Testimony].  
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resources for, and a commitment to, an effective SEC 
examination program for investment advisers should be a high 
priority for policy makers and for the SEC. 
During the past few years, the SEC has focused on 
revitalizing and restructuring its enforcement and examination 
functions.109  The mission of the examination program is to 
“improve compliance, prevent fraud, inform policy and monitor 
industry-wide and firm-specific risks.”110  The SEC has 
implemented a more risk-focused examination program to 
provide information for SEC enforcement investigations and to 
inform the financial industry about risky practices.  The program 
continually collects and analyzes a wide variety of data about 
investment advisers using quantitative techniques.111 
OCIE has continued to refine its examination tools and 
techniques to better allocate and leverage limited resources to 
their highest and best use.112  In 2011, OCIE created a 
centralized risk assessment and surveillance office to evaluate 
risks across all markets and registrant categories.  OCIE’s risk 
office has enhanced the ability of the SEC to perform data 
analytics to identify firms that present the “greatest risks” to 
investors, markets, and capital formation, and to determine 
which firms to examine.113  OCIE now provides a risk-rating to 
all new and existing investment adviser registrants based on 
data collected from the newly expanded Form ADV and other 
public data.  In addition, OCIE has increased its outreach to 
senior management and mutual fund boards along with the 
examination process regarding risk and regulatory issues.114  
OCIE has also developed a large firm monitoring program 
whereby OCIE collaborates with SEC divisions and offices in 
monitoring risks at certain large firms.115  Under this new 
 
109 See generally SEC 2012 Testimony, supra note 49. 
110 Carlo V. Di Florio, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Private Equity International Private Fund 
Compliance Forum (May 2, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Di Florio Speech], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch050212cvd.htm. 
111 See SEC 2012 Testimony, supra note 49. 
112 See 2012 Di Florio Speech, supra note 110. 
113 See id.; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXAMINATIONS BY THE SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS 8 (2012) 
[hereinafter OCIE EXAMINATIONS], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ 
ocie/ocieoverview.pdf. 
114 See 2012 Di Florio Speech, supra note 110. 
115 See id. 
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process, OCIE’s examinations are tailored to a firm’s risk rating 
and risk areas such as business model and revenue streams, 
affiliations and conflicts of interest, and compliance controls.  
OCIE also uses tips, complaints, referrals, and surprise custody 
audits to help determine which advisers to examine and the 
scope of the exams.116 
The SEC has also continued to take important steps to 
increase the examination staff’s expertise in the securities 
markets including recruiting experts with knowledge of hedge 
funds, private equity, derivatives, complex structured products, 
and valuation, as well as strengthening current examiner skill 
sets and developing an examiner certification program.117  In 
addition, OCIE is developing information management systems 
to help better organize and evaluate the extensive new 
information that the SEC collects on Form ADV and Form PF.118  
These systems will provide the SEC with substantial additional 
detailed information about advisers’ business practices to assist 
in risk-targeted examinations, enforcement, and oversight of 
advisers.119 
In fiscal year 2011, OCIE examined approximately eight 
percent of advisers out of the 11,000 or so SEC-registered 
investment advisers, representing thirty percent of the total 
AUM by all SEC-registered investment advisers.120  While the 
number of advisers examined can and should be increased, the 
SEC’s breadth in covering thirty percent of investors’ assets 
 
116 See id. 
117 See id.; see also The Stanford Ponzi Scheme: Lessons for Protecting Investors 
from the Next Securities Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of 
Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Carlo Di Florio, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission); Oversight of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Operations, Activities, Challenges, and FY 
2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t 
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 70–71 (2011) 
(statement of Carlo Di Florio, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission); SECTION 914 REPORT, supra 
note 20, at 28. 
118 2012 Di Florio Speech, supra note 110. 
119 See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain 
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3145, 2011 WL 242758, at *4 (proposed Jan. 
26, 2011). 
120 See SEC 2012 Testimony, supra note 49. 
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managed by advisers is substantial.121  Further, as noted above, 
OCIE reviews data and information about all investment 
advisers.  Both at a national and regional level, the examination 
staff then can identify from the adviser universe the set of 
advisers with the most “risky” profiles and subject those advisers 
to in-depth examinations.  The SEC plans to add examination 
staff in fiscal year 2014 to improve the rate of examination of 
advisers, including those advisers that have not been 
examined.122  Even now, however, OCIE conducts outreach to 
new advisers and those that have never been examined.  The 
SEC requests information from such advisers and, based on that 
information and other data, prioritizes such advisers for review.  
Contrary to the perceptions created by some statistics, all 
investment advisers are on OCIE’s radar screen. 
The IAA continues to encourage the SEC to consider ways in 
which it can increase the frequency of investment adviser 
examinations under its current allocation of resources and any 
future allocated resources.  However, we are prepared to support 
user fees to the SEC to increase the SEC’s frequency of 
examinations of investment advisers.  User fees would be a far 
more effective approach than outsourcing the SEC’s 
responsibilities to a non-governmental organization. 
CONCLUSION 
The IAA supports appropriate measures to ensure that the 
SEC conducts a strong and effective examination program of 
investment advisers.  We strongly oppose establishment of an 
SRO for investment advisers such as that which would have been 
mandated by H.R. 4624 and urge Congress to instead consider 
appropriate user fee legislation. 
 
121 We note, however, that the frequency of examination per adviser is only one 
factor in an effective examination and oversight program. See SECTION 914 REPORT, 
supra note 20, at 26 n.46; see also 156 CONG. REC. S5929 (2010) (statement of Sen. 
Christopher Dodd) (stating the following with respect to Section 913: “In this review, 
the paramount issue is effectiveness. If regulatory examinations are frequent or 
lengthy but fail to identify significant misconduct—for example, examinations of 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC—they waste resources and create an 
illusion of effective regulatory oversight that misleads the public.”). 
122 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2014: 
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 56 
(2013) (statement of Mary Jo White, Chairman, Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
